Description

Title Beating Cheating: Dealing with Collusion in the Non-Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Abstract The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is a well-known challenging problem for researching multi-agent interactions in competitive and cooperative situations. In this paper, we present the Ask-First (AF) strategy for playing multi-agent non-Iterated PD (nIPD) that is based on evolving trust chains between agents. Each agent maintains a (relatively small) table containing trust values of other agents. When agents are to play each other, they ask their neighbours what trust they put in the opponent. Chains are then followed until an agent is found that knows the opponent and the trust value is propagated back through the chain. The played move is then decided based upon this trust value. When two agents have played each other, they update their trust tables on the basis of the outcome of the game. The strategy is first evaluated in a benchmark scenario where it is shown that it outperforms a number of benchmark strategies. Secondly, we evaluate the strategy in a scenario with a group of colluding agents. The experiments show that the AF strategy is successful here as well. We conclude that the AF strategy is a highly flexible, scalable and distributed way (the chain topology adapts to the way that agents are picked to play each other) to deal with a difficult multi-agent nIPD problem (i.e., robust against collusions).

Other presentations by Nicolas Höning

DateTitle
17 November 2008 Beating Cheating: Dealing with Collusion in the Non-Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma